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ABSTRACT: The success of the IEEE 802.11 series of standards has led to a proliferation of 
affordable and interoperable wireless networking devices. Wireless functionality is an 
integrated feature of many laptops, personal digital assistants, and even mobile phones. With 
the ratification of the security enhancement to IEEE 802.11, referred to as IEEE 802.11i, in 
2004 and the subsequent availability of implementations of the standard in current hardware, 
many of the security concerns surrounding the original wireless standards would seem to 
have been addressed. Are the security enhanced features of IEEE 802.11i, however, suitable 
for securing access to Australian Government information systems? In this paper, we review 
the capability of the security features of IEEE 802.11i to address the requirements for 
securing access to Government information systems as expressed in the Australian 
Government information technology security manual (ACSI33). Our review identifies the 
requirements of ACSI33 and reveals that a number of these can be met by specific security 
configurations of IEEE 802.11i. Meeting these requirements, however, is highly dependent 
not only on the correct configuration of the wireless networking components, but also the 
supporting authentication infrastructure. Additionally, remaining vulnerabilities in the IEEE 
802.11i standard are identified as are vulnerabilities introduced by the use of mobile and 
wireless devices. 
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The ratification of enhanced security standards for IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN technology in 
2004 (IEEE, 2004) and the recent appearance of these standards in consumer off the shelf 
(COTS) products would seem to suggest that many of the security concerns and issues raised by 
the original flawed security measures in products based on IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN standards 
may no longer be valid.  
 
There is no doubt that the adoption of wireless networking technology can provide cost effective 
and convenient access to networked information systems, but are the current security standards 
for wireless networks sufficient for protecting access to government information systems that 
may contain sensitive, or even classified, information? 
 
In this paper we review the protective security measures that are required for securing access to 
government information systems and evaluate the extent to which current wireless LAN 
technology can meet these requirements. Configuration and deployment constraints are identified 
and remaining vulnerabilities are discussed. 
1.1 Structure 
In the following section (Section 2) the current security capabilities of wireless LAN technology 
based on the IEEE 802.11i standard are summarised. The specific information and 
communications technology security requirements for accessing government information systems, 
including the specific cryptographic algorithms and protocols that are required to protect 
classified information, are presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents the configuration 
requirements for securing access to government information systems holding non-national 
security related information at a sensitivity up to IN-CONFIDENCE. This is followed by a 
discussion of deployment considerations and the identification of vulnerabilities that remain and 
must be mitigated by other means. A summary and conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
2 IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN Security 
IEEE 802.11 wireless networks initially suffered from numerous security weaknesses.  However, 
since industry adoption of the security enhancements described in the IEEE 802.11i standard 
(IEEE, 2004), many of the original weaknesses have been addressed.  IEEE 802.11i uses the 
notion of a robust security network (RSN) which provides a number of improved security 
services to the medium access control (MAC) layer protocols.  In this section we discuss the 
extent to which the security services provided by an RSN meet the general security requirements 
of wireless networks.   
 
The US Government’s Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) has produced a “Wireless 
LAN Security Framework” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2005) which identifies six 
security requirements for wireless LANs: (1) access control; (2) identification and authentication; 
(3) confidentiality; (4) integrity; (5) availability; and (6) logging and monitoring.  The 802.11i 
enhancements do not directly address either of the availability or logging and monitoring 
requirements, and we provide further discussion of these issues in Section 5.  However, the first 
four requirements are addressed, in certain configurations, by 802.11i and in the remainder of this 
section we detail the specific security services provided by an RSN which address these 
requirements.   
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2.1 Access Control 
The only access control performed by IEEE 802.11i RSN access points is to prevent all 
communications over the IEEE 802.1X controlled port until the wireless device (STA) has 
successfully authenticated via the IEEE 802.1X uncontrolled port.  The uncontrolled port allows 
authentication-related messages from the STA to be forwarded between the access point (AP) and 
the authentication server (AS).  Once the STA has authenticated no filtering of traffic transmitted 
over the controlled port is performed. 
 
While some access points may support basic packet filtering capabilities, they are unlikely to 
support the more sophisticated features (richer filtering options and application awareness) 
associated with high-end firewall products.  Therefore it is likely that a special-purpose firewall 
device will be needed in order to provide an adequate access control function. 
2.2 Identification and Authentication 
The RSN relies on IEEE 802.1X port-based network access control (described above) and the 
extensible authentication protocol (EAP) to provide support for upper layer authentication, to an 
AS, such as a remote authentication dial in user service (RADIUS) server, for example.  On 
successful completion of an EAP method, the STA and the AS will have performed mutual 
authentication and will have established a pairwise master key (PMK).   
 
If the AS is not co-located with the AP, the PMK must be securely transmitted to the AP. The AP 
and STA now use the PMK as an input to the IEEE 802.11i 4-way handshake to derive the 
pairwise transient key (PTK) and establish the security association that will secure the link layer. 
 
Numerous concrete EAP methods have been defined that meet a range of authentication goals. 
Specific EAP methods and their suitability for deployment in the wireless LAN environment are 
discussed in Section 4.1. 
2.3 Confidentiality and Integrity 
The 802.11i RSN introduces two new protocols which provide confidentiality and integrity 
services for wireless LAN communications.  The first, the temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP), 
which in addition to providing confidentiality via the RC4 cipher, uses a message integrity code 
called Michael, as well as per-frame keys.  While TKIP is an improvement over the much 
maligned WEP, it is now known to be vulnerable to a denial of service attack (Edney and 
Arbaugh, 2004).   
 
The second protocol, the counter-mode/CBC-MAC protocol (CCMP) uses the advanced 
encryption standard (AES) in counter mode with 128-bit blocks and a 128-bit key.  CCMP uses a 
cipher block chaining message authentication code (CBC-MAC) to provide integrity protection 
in addition to confidentiality protection. As discussed in Section 3.3 AES is an algorithm 
approved for use in government environments. 
3 Australian Government Information Technology Security 
Requirements 
As custodians of valuable information, that is “information critical to the performance of 
government functions, or information whose compromise or misuse would adversely affect the 
government, the community, or the individual to whom it relates” (Attorney General’s 
Department, 2000) the Australian Government has a responsibility to adequately protect such 
information. The protective measures employed to prevent the disclosure or misuse of 
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information identified as valuable must be both economically and operationally effective and in 
order to support this aim, the Australian Government mandates the use of a risk management 
based approach to information security management (Attorney General’s Department, 2000). A 
risk management based approach seeks to ensure that the level of protection applied to a resource 
is commensurate with the level of risk faced. Typically, with information, risk is considered to be 
dominated by the magnitude of the consequences of disclosure. 
3.1 Relevant Standards & Guidelines 
There are two major documents that define the protective security requirements for information 
and communications technology and its use by the government. These are the Commonwealth 
Protective Security Manual, or PSM (Attorney General’s Department, 2000) which: 
 
“... sets out the policies, practices and procedures that provide a protective 
security environment that is not only fundamental to good business and 
management practice, but essential for good government. It also lays down the 
procedures designed to ensure that departments and agencies approach 
protective security measures in a way that is consistent across government.”  
 
and the Australian Government Information and Communications Technology Security Manual, 
or ACSI33 (Defence Signals Directorate, 2006) which provides supplementary guidance and 
policies to the protective security manual that ensure a minimum standard of protection for 
information and communications technology across government agencies. 
 
These two documents, in turn, draw on recognised Australian standards for risk management. For 
example: AS/NZS 4360:2004 Risk management (Standards Australia, 2004a); HB 436:2004 Risk 
Management Guidelines – Companion to AS/NZS 4360:2004 (Standards Australia, 2004b); and 
AS/NZS HB231:2004 Information security risk management guidelines (Standards Australia, 
2004c). 
 
Any adoption of wireless LAN communications technology for the storage, processing, or 
transmission of information within the government must meet the requirements set out by these 
two documents. While the requirements identified by both must be wholly addressed, specific 
requirements can be found in: Part B – Managing security risk and Part C – Information security 
of the PSM; and Part 3.8 – Communications Security, Part 3.9 – Cryptography, and Part 3.10 – 
Network Security of ACSI33.  
 
The extent to which wireless LAN equipment based on the IEEE 802.11i standards can meet the 
requirements identified by the PSM and ACSI33 are detailed in Section 4 of this paper.  
3.2 Australian Government Information Security Classifications 
Current Australian Government guidelines require protective measures to be in place to ensure 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of valuable information. To aid in the selection of 
appropriate confidentiality protective measures, an information classification system is employed 
by the Australian Government. The classification level assigned to information reflects the 
severity of the consequences if such information were disclosed and determines the specific 
protective measures that must be employed.  
 
Not all information needs to be security classified. Some information held by the government (e.g. 
governmental websites) is authorised for unlimited access by the public, this information should 
be labelled PUBLIC DOMAIN. UNCLASSIFIED information, is information that is not for 
unlimited release (i.e. PUBLIC DOMAIN), but also does not require the protective measures that 
are associated with a security classification. Information in the UNCLASSIFIED category is 
distributed on a need-to-know basis, and disclosure of this information to the public is only 
permitted with explicit authorisation from an agency head or under freedom of information (FOI) 
provisions. Unlabelled information is assumed to be unclassified, or is otherwise explicitly 
labelled as UNCLASSIFIED. 
  
Security classified information is information that a risk assessment has identified as having 
adverse consequences should it be disclosed, and as such requires extra protective measures. 
Security classified information is protected by procedural, physical and technical 
countermeasures (as detailed in the PSM and ACSI33). Security classified information is broadly 
grouped into two categories: non-national security and national security related information. 
Non-national security classified information will be labelled either IN-CONFIDENCE, 
PROTECTED, or HIGHLY PROTECTED. National security classified information will be 
labelled RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET. The information 
security classifications are depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Information security classifications 
3.3 Approved Algorithms and Protocols 
Specific policies and procedures associated with the handling of security classified information in 
information and communications systems are provided in ACSI33. In particular, ACSI33 defines 
the minimum requirements of cryptographic algorithms and protocols used to authenticate access 
to, and to protect the confidentiality and integrity of, stored and transmitted information. 
 
The requirements for protection increase with the security sensitivity of the information being 
protected and range from the use of DSD approved cryptographic algorithms (DACA) and DSD 
approved cryptographic protocols (DACP) to more stringent assurance requirements such as 
those required for evaluation under Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 2005) and the DSD approved 
product (DAP) programmes. 
 
Information classified as IN-CONFIDENCE when transmitted over PUBLIC DOMAIN or 
UNCLASSIFIED networks 1  must, at a minimum, employ a DSD approved cryptographic 
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1 Wireless networks may be considered PUBLIC DOMAIN. 
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algorithm and protocol. Approved algorithms are presented in Table 1. The transmission of more 
sensitive information will require the use of evaluated and approved products.2 The absence of 
evaluated standards-based wireless products limits our discussion and analysis to non-national 
security classified information no more sensitive than IN-CONFIDENCE.  
Table 1: Approved Algorithms 
Algorithm Restrictions Application 
Diffie-Hellman Modulus > 1023 bits Session key agreement 
Digital signature algorithm (DSA) Modulus > 1023 bits Digital signatures 
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Modulus > 1023 bits Separate signing and encryption keys
Digital signatures, session key 
transport 
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 
(ECDH) Field / key size > 159 bits Session key agreement 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 
Algorithm (ECDSA) Field / key size > 159 bits Digital signatures 
Advanced encryption standard 
(AES) 
128, 192, 256 bit keys 
Electronic codebook mode 
prohibited 
Message encryption 
Triple data encryption standard 
(3DES) 
3 distinct keys, or 2 keys in 
prescribed order. Electronic 
codebook mode prohibited 
Message encryption 
MD5  Message hashing 
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-
384, SHA-5123  Message hashing 
 
Only three protocols are considered DACP’s. These are transport layer security (TLS), secure 
sockets layer (SSL)4 configured to only use DACA’s, and secure shell (SSH) with a restrictive 
server configuration. The following section (Section 4) discusses the configuration and use of 
standards-based wireless LAN technology for the access and transmission of non-national 
security related information. 
4 Securing Wireless LAN Access to Government Information 
Systems 
ACSI33 states that agencies should not use wireless communications for the transmission of 
classified information. However, whenever this is required, the classified information should be 
appropriately protected using a DACA/DACP or an evaluated method as per guidelines stated in 
ACSI33. This section discusses how IEEE 802.11i based link layer protection can be used to 
protect IN-CONFIDENCE information transmitted over a wireless network as per ACSI33 and 
DSD requirements. 
4.1 Identification and Authentication  
Given the open nature of wireless communications, access to network resources via wireless 
transmissions would appear to meet the definition of remote access given by ACSI33  (Defence 
Signals Directorate, 2006) : 
 “Remote access is any access to an agency’s system from a location not within the 
physical control of that agency.”  
                                                 
2  Currently, no standards-based wireless LAN solutions have achieved Common Criteria 
certification. Aruba Networks did, however, achieve FIPS 140-2 certification for its IEEE 
802.11i based products in April 2006.  
3 DSD recommends the SHA family of hashing algorithms. 
4 SSL must be at least version 3.0. 
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In remote access scenarios, ACSI33 recommends more stringent measures to authenticate remote 
users based on public key digital certificates or two-factor authentication. Additionally, in order 
to protect WLAN users from unintentionally connecting to rogue devices, the process of 
authentication must be mutual, with the user gaining assurance that they are connecting to 
authorised infrastructure components. 802.11 WLANs have adopted the IEEE 802.1X based 
authentication framework, with EAP providing concrete authentication methods.  
 
IETF RFC 4017 (Stanley & Walker, 2005), besides other recommendations, details the 
mandatory and recommended requirements for performing mutual authentication and subsequent 
cryptographic key generation and distribution via EAP methods in wireless LANs. The 
mandatory requirements include: 1) Generation of symmetric keying material, 2) 128 bit key 
strength, 3) mutual authentication, 4) shared state equivalence, 5) resistance to dictionary attacks, 
6) protection against man-in-the-middle attacks and 7) protected ciphersuite negotiation. 
 
Hence, when considering adequate EAP methods for authenticating WLAN clients in the 
government environment, there are three major sources of requirements that must be addressed: 
 
1. The requirement for strongly authenticating remote access users as specified in ACSI33. 
 
2. The requirement for an EAP method that provides mutual authentication between the 
STA and the AS, as specified by IEEE 802.11i for Robust Secure Network Associations 
(RSNA). 
 
3. The security requirements for deployment of EAP methods in wireless environments 
specified by RFC 4017. 
 
While the Wi-Fi Alliance 5  has certified EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2, EAP-SIM, 
PEAPv0/EAPMSCHAPv2 and PEAPv1/EAP-GTC authentication methods as suitable for use in 
WLANs using WPA and WPA2; only two of the certified EAP methods meet the requirements 
specified in IETF RFC 4017, the strong authentication requirement for remote access required by 
ACSI33, and the mutual authentication requirement for RSNA required by IEEE 802.11i. As can 
be seen from Table 2 only two EAP methods currently support the identified requirements – 
EAP-TLS and EAP-SIM. The EAP methods based on MSCHAP fail to meet the strong 
authentication requirement as they only use a password as a single authentication factor. In spite 
of using strong authentication, EAP-GTC is specifically identified in RFC4017 as a non-
compliant EAP method and fails to perform mutual authentication. 
 
While TLS is commonly used to provide confidentiality and integrity services, it is only used for 
authentication and key exchange in EAP-TLS. The session key that results from the EAP 
exchange becomes the pairwise master key (PMK) that is subsequently used by the IEEE 802.11i 
4-way handshake to establish the security association between the STA and the AP. Provided the 
network is configured to be a WPA2 Only network (i.e. WPA2 without compatibility mode), the 
AES cipher (a DACA) in CCM mode will be used to provide confidentiality and integrity 
protection to ongoing communications.  
 
EAP-TLS, when configured to use only: ECDSA, ECDH with 160 bit key; RSA, DSA, or Diffie-
Hellman key exchange with a modulus of at least 1024 bits; and MD5 or SHA hashing 
algorithms; can be considered a DACP.  Provided the 802.11i 4-way handshake is considered a 
 
5 The Wi-Fi Alliance is an international association formed to certify interoperability of IEEE 
802.11 products (http://www.wi-fi.org ) 
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DACP too, the complete process of key establishment and authentication in IEEE 802.11i can be 
regarded as a DACP. 
 
Table 2: Overview of Wi-Fi Alliance approved EAP Methods 
Requirements 
Method RFC4017 ACSI33 (Strong Authentication) 
IEEE 802.11i 
(Mutual Authentication) 
EAP-TLS √ √ √ 
EAP-TTLS / 
MSCHAPv2 × × √ 
PEAPv0 / MSCHAPv2 × × √ 
PEAPv1 / EAP-GTC × √ × 
EAP-SIM √ √ √ 
 
However, the algorithms and protocol used by EAP-SIM are not DSD approved and may require 
evaluation prior to consideration as an appropriate authentication strategy for Australian 
Government applications. As can be seen from the review presented, the only EAP method 
suitable for use in authenticating access to government information systems is EAP-TLS. 
4.2 Confidentiality, Integrity  
As discussed in Section 2.3, IEEE 802.11i provides two mechanisms for integrity and 
confidentiality protection: AES-CCMP and TKIP. The transmission of IN-CONFIDENCE 
information over a wireless network requires DACA protection as per ACSI33. In government 
information systems, whenever IN-CONFIDENCE information is transmitted over an IEEE 
802.11i wireless network, AES-CCMP should always be the only mode used for data 
confidentiality and integrity, as AES is a DACA, which is not the case for WEP or TKIP. In 
addition WEP and TKIP are vulnerable to attacks (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2006).  
 
Deployment of a mixed WLAN where both RSNA and Pre-RSNA (WEP and the original 802.11 
authentication) algorithms co-exist is strongly discouraged as it does not satisfy DSD 
requirements of a DACA/DACP and leaves the network vulnerable to security rollback attacks. 
Such an attack is particularly potent as it may result in keying material utilised in RSNA 
becoming known if the adversary is able to exploit the weaknesses in the pre-RSNA algorithms 
(He & Mitchell, 2005). 
4.3 Summary 
When IN-CONFIDENCE information is exchanged between the STA and the AP over the 
wireless medium, ACSI33 requires this information to be protected using a DACP. If the IEEE 
802.11i 4-way handshake can be considered a DACP, the combination of EAP-TLS for 
authentication and master key generation, the 4-way hand shake for session key generation and 
authentication of the AP, and AES for protecting the link layer, may be considered a suitable 
approach to securing the transmission of IN-CONFIDENCE information. 
5 Deployment Considerations 
As described in Section 4, it is possible to reduce the threat exposure of an IEEE 802.11i WLAN 
in a government environment by carefully configuring it to use government approved and 
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appropriately strong authentication methods and confidentiality/integrity protection methods. 
However, due to protocol weaknesses and the lack of maturity of configuration management 
processes and tools, WLANs are still vulnerable to attacks. This section discusses these 
vulnerabilities and highlights the role of logging and monitoring in mitigating threats to WLANs. 
5.1 Remaining Vulnerabilities 
While IEEE 802.11i implements robust authentication, confidentiality and integrity protection 
measures, availability protection has been largely ignored. A significant problem that remains, in 
IEEE 802.11i networks, is that the management frames used by the MAC layer are not 
authenticated. Neither the original IEEE 802.11 standards, nor the recent IEEE 802.11i standard 
specify mechanisms for protecting the integrity of management frames, leaving IEEE 802.11 
based WLANs vulnerable to management frame spoofing and the associated denial of service 
attacks (DoS) that such spoofing permits (Bellardo and Savage, 2003). Even the EAP frames 
used for authentication in 802.11i networks are unprotected and can be easily used as a means to 
launch similar attacks against wireless LANs (Mishra & Arbaugh, 2003). 
 
When 802.1X is used for authentication, unauthenticated EAP messages are transmitted by the 
authenticator from the wireless network to a critical wired network component, the authentication 
server. There have previously been attribute value pair buffer overflow vulnerabilities in some 
RADIUS server implementations6 that allowed remote, unauthenticated users to interfere with the 
operation of a network’s authentication server. Hence unauthenticated WLAN frames not only 
leave the WLANs vulnerable, but also expose the network’s wired components to attacks. 
 
Besides availability vulnerabilities, immaturity of the administrative controls available for 
configuration and implementation of wireless enabled devices can also expose the WLAN 
infrastructure and clients to an increased level of vulnerability. Misconfiguration of wireless 
capabilities can result in security breaches like rollback attacks where an adversary might trick 
wireless clients and APs into using weaker security measures which are vulnerable to attacks.  
Failure to correctly configure and constrain the functionality of wireless devices may result in the 
device inadvertently providing a bridge into the secure corporate network, bypassing corporate 
access control mechanisms such as firewalls and routers.    
 
The increased use of mobile and portable devices also poses an increased level of threat to secure 
WLANs such as those used in government information networks.  A wireless client that is 
typically used to connect to the secure WLAN might, at some point, also be used to connect to a 
third party hotspot or an adhoc network. If the wireless client is infected by malicious code 
during such a connection, it might provide an avenue for this code to enter the secure WLAN.   
 
Poor programming practices in implementations of operating systems and low level kernel code 
can also leave gaping security holes which can readily be exploited to install root kits and 
backdoors in insecure wireless nodes. For instance security researchers recently demonstrated 
that a vulnerable wireless node can be compromised without the target node having to even 
establish a connection to the network7.  Hence an unsuspecting node may be compromised as a 
result of simply having its wireless network adapter powered on.  
 
6 For example see http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/589523 and 
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/898931. 
 
7 http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1998452,00.asp  
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5.2 Logging and Monitoring 
Failure of IEEE 802.11i protection in mitigating all threats to WLANs together with concerns 
that implementation errors or misconfigurations may diminish the effectiveness of its core 
security services, highlights the requirement of supplementing preventative security measures 
with a capability to detect and respond to security events. These security events include not only 
attacks but also violations of the security policy such as not using the specified cryptographic 
algorithm, or operating in ad-hoc mode. 
 
The level of exposure to threats and the severity of the consequences of a successful attack 
dictate the level of security required for any network. From Section 4, it is clear that WLAN 
security is still immature and hence WLANs require rigorous compliance with a carefully crafted 
security policy and best practice guidelines. WLANs provide a lot of flexibility in terms of 
methods used for data confidentiality (AES/TKIP), authentication (various EAP methods) and 
cryptographic key management (pre-shared, EAP). However, not all the methods and their 
combinations are secure or approved for use in government information networks. This 
underlines the importance of establishing of a comprehensive wireless security policy which 
clearly dictates the WLAN security configurations/methods permitted based on a thorough 
analysis of government guidelines, security requirements and threat exposure.  
 
However, establishing a security policy is only the first step towards comprehensive security 
management.  While periodic audits (or reviews) of wireless node configurations is an important 
step in ensuring that they comply with the requirements defined in the policy, constant 
monitoring of WLAN traffic should also be carried out to provide continued assurance that the 
nodes are acting in a manner which is consistent with the security policy.  The monitoring system 
should run continuously in a passive fashion so that it remains undetectable itself and hence is 
less likely to become prone to attacks. The monitoring system should not only be capable of 
detecting misuse and attacks but should also be able to perform security compliance monitoring. 
It should be capable of detecting attacks on both the wireless and wired components of the 
network as even wired components (e.g. RADIUS servers) can become exposed via insecure 
WLANs. Such a system should also maintain extensive logs of all activity for auditing purposes. 
In practice, such a monitoring system would most likely be implemented as a wireless intrusion 
detection system (WIDS). Most modern WIDS only implement attack detection.  One approach 
for implementing both attack detection and security policy compliance monitoring in a WIDS is 
to use a specification-based intrusion detection system rather than traditional misused-based or 
anomaly-based techniques where the specification used by the intrusion detection system is 
derived from network protocol state transition models and the site security policy constraints 
(Gill et al., 2006).  
 
Some WIDS also implement wireless intrusion response/prevention techniques. However, yet 
again, the techniques used to implement wireless intrusion prevention are far from robust and 
accurate. Most exploit the lack of protection of management frames in the WLAN protocols to 
target an unauthorised AP or STA. In fact one has to be very careful in carrying out intrusion 
prevention techniques as they can easily affect other clients in the WLAN and/or not work 
appropriately. As wireless intrusion prevention techniques tend to be active, involving injection 
of new traffic into the WLAN, they are also prone to passive fingerprinting. An adversary can 
passively monitor the WLAN for intrusion prevention traffic from the WIDS and fingerprint the 
kind of WIDS deployed. Therefore, it is necessary to carefully evaluate the wireless intrusion 
prevention techniques before use in an active WLAN deployment.  
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6 Summary and Conclusions  
This paper has reviewed the requirements for securing wireless LAN access to government 
information systems using the most recently ratified security enhancements to the IEEE 802.11 
standards. This review reveals that under specific and restrictive configurations, IEEE 802.11i 
wireless LANs may be suitable for securing access to non-national security information systems 
holding information classified as IN-CONFIDENCE. Specifically, wireless LANs must be 
configured to only authenticate users with EAP-TLS, provide link layer confidentiality and 
integrity services with AES, and provide a supporting logging and monitoring system. 
 
Given the limited number of acceptable configurations it would be prudent to ensure that 
technical or procedural measures are in place to ensure that all wireless devices within the 
government environment are security policy compliant. Unfortunately the range of tools for 
supporting this goal by technical means is limited. The use of recently proposed specification-
based intrusion detection systems was presented as one effective approach for monitoring for 
security policy compliance, but technical solutions based on this approach are not yet widely 
available. Any deployment of wireless LAN technology, therefore, will require significant 
procedural discipline to ensure that network components and devices are configured to meet the 
strict security requirements for deployment in the government environment. 
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